Время: 24 марта (Пятница) 14.00 МСК
Спикер: Dzhamilya Nigmatulina (HEC Lausanne)
Название: Sanctions and Misallocation. How Sanctioned Firms Won and Russia Lost.
Область исследования
"My research is in Macroeconomics and Development. The means I use neutral experiments to causally estimate policies affecting specific firms and households, and macro models to calculate the effect of these policies on the aggregate."
Какую проблему призвано решить ваше исследование?
"The research tries to calculate the effect of 2014-2020 sanctions against Russian firms on the aggregate economy."
Что обнаружило ваше исследование?
"My findings show that sanctions hit specific firms, but were followed by subsidies and government contracts that made these firms do better than in the absence of sanctions. The sanctioned firms were already inefficiently large before sanctions, and the event of sanctions+protection made the inefficiency worse. On the net, the Russian economy lost at least 0.33% of GDP because of over-protection of targeted firms after sanctions."
Абстракт: Using a unique natural experiment of staggered firm-level sanctions against Russia in 2014-2020 and the data on over 600,000 Russian firms, I estimate the effect of sanctions on targeted firms and on the aggregate economy. Surprisingly, sanctioned firms on average gained 38% more capital inputs after sanctions relative to the industry trends. The effect is in part driven by sanctioned state-owned firms, getting 60% more capital relative to non-sanctioned firms. Using additional data on subsidies and government contracts, I find that this result is explained by the government protection of targeted firms, that more than compensated for a negative sanctions shock. However, the sanctioned firms were already too large and had too much capital prior to sanctions. I use a heterogeneous firm framework to show that the distortions between sanctioned and non-sanctioned firms, which existed before the sanctions, got exacerbated after the joint effect of sanctions and government protection. I combine the causal estimates with the quantitative framework and estimate that on the aggregate, the Russian TFP dropped at least by 0.33% reaching 3% in relevant sectors.
Более подробная информация, ссылка на работу и на предстоящий семинар здесь.
Всех ждем!
Спикер: Dzhamilya Nigmatulina (HEC Lausanne)
Название: Sanctions and Misallocation. How Sanctioned Firms Won and Russia Lost.
Область исследования
"My research is in Macroeconomics and Development. The means I use neutral experiments to causally estimate policies affecting specific firms and households, and macro models to calculate the effect of these policies on the aggregate."
Какую проблему призвано решить ваше исследование?
"The research tries to calculate the effect of 2014-2020 sanctions against Russian firms on the aggregate economy."
Что обнаружило ваше исследование?
"My findings show that sanctions hit specific firms, but were followed by subsidies and government contracts that made these firms do better than in the absence of sanctions. The sanctioned firms were already inefficiently large before sanctions, and the event of sanctions+protection made the inefficiency worse. On the net, the Russian economy lost at least 0.33% of GDP because of over-protection of targeted firms after sanctions."
Абстракт: Using a unique natural experiment of staggered firm-level sanctions against Russia in 2014-2020 and the data on over 600,000 Russian firms, I estimate the effect of sanctions on targeted firms and on the aggregate economy. Surprisingly, sanctioned firms on average gained 38% more capital inputs after sanctions relative to the industry trends. The effect is in part driven by sanctioned state-owned firms, getting 60% more capital relative to non-sanctioned firms. Using additional data on subsidies and government contracts, I find that this result is explained by the government protection of targeted firms, that more than compensated for a negative sanctions shock. However, the sanctioned firms were already too large and had too much capital prior to sanctions. I use a heterogeneous firm framework to show that the distortions between sanctioned and non-sanctioned firms, which existed before the sanctions, got exacerbated after the joint effect of sanctions and government protection. I combine the causal estimates with the quantitative framework and estimate that on the aggregate, the Russian TFP dropped at least by 0.33% reaching 3% in relevant sectors.
Более подробная информация, ссылка на работу и на предстоящий семинар здесь.
Всех ждем!